Abstract This article argues that the analogy between conceptual changes in the history of science and conceptual changes in the development of young children is problematic. We show that the notions of 'conceptual change' in Kuhn and Piaget's projects, the two thinkers whose work is most commonly drawn upon to support this analogy, are not compatible in the sense usually claimed. We contend that Kuhn's work pertains not so much to the psychology of individual scientists, but to the way philosophers and historians should describe developments in communities of scientists. Furthermore, we argue that the analogy is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of science and the relation between science and common sense. The distinctiveness of the two notions of conceptual change has implications for science education research, since it raises serious questions about the relevance of Kuhn's remarks for the study of pedagogical issues.
Introduction
Thomas Kuhn's work in the history and philosophy of science has played a highly influential role in the programme of Conceptual Change in science education (CC) conceptual changes that young children undergo in school science classrooms, when they are asked to make the move from an intuitive way of understanding natural phenomena to a scientific one, resembles conceptual changes in the history of science.
2 On this reading, historical studies of paradigm changes in science can help us understand the conceptual problems faced by pupils in school science. For example, Hewson (1981, p. 383) 
argues:
Learning science is complex -a student has at different times to acquire new information, reorganize existing knowledge and even discard cherished ideas. In addressing this issue, the analogy between individual learning and conceptual change in scientific disciplines has been fruitful in providing aspects of a suitable framework for analysing science learning.
Driver (1983, pp. 9-10) asks:
[...] children sometimes need to undergo paradigm shifts in their thinking. Max Planck suggested that new theories do not convert people, it is just that old men die. If scientists have this difficulty in reformulating their conceptions of the world, is it a wonder that children sometimes have a struggle to do so? Vosniadou and Brewer (1987, pp. 54-55) express the analogy in the following way:
According to Kuhn, the exercise of 'normal science' involves the articulation of an existing paradigm that may result in theory change. Only when these attempts at articulation fail repeatedly does the motivation for a true paradigm shift arise. Paradigm shifts happen in an effort to resolve anomalies that exist in the relation of existing theory to observations (Kuhn [1996] , p. 97). The development of knowledge in the child can be seen in similar terms, as a process of enriching and elaborating existing 'theories' that can give rise to theory change, in other words to weak restructurings. Occasionally, when the child is faced with major anomalies that existing conceptual structures cannot account for, a new paradigm is required, giving rise to radical restructurings.
As part of research in science education, CC investigates the ways in which what pupils already know impacts on what they are supposed to learn in school science. One fundamental assumption of CC is the view that pupils' prior knowledge--alternatively called 'naïve knowledge' (Vosniadou 1989), 'naïve beliefs' (McCloskey 1983; Reiner et al. 1988) , 'informal science ' (Driver et al. 1994) , or 'children's science' (Osborne 1980; Gilbert et al. 1982; Kuhn 1989b )--is 'in conflict' or 'in competition' with what they are supposed to learn in school science. The problem for science education then seems to be one of inducing conceptual change in pupils, from naïve/informal to scientific knowledge.
3 Given
